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writing to A.B.A. National Institutes, Division of Section Services, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago, Ill. 60637. Checks should be enclosed in the amount of $5.00 per copy. The Proceedings will be mailed when printed. ROBERT The last decade has witnessed considerable evolution in the practice of recognition of new governments that have come to power by irregular means. Many of these changes appear to have gone almost unnoticed by many scholars in the field.
Of particular significance is the denial by Miss Marjorie Whiteman, Assistant Legal Adviser to the Department of State, in Volume II of her work, of a difference in the character of recognition, i.e., de facto or de jure recognition.' Miss Whiteman lends her authority to this position when she states in Volume II of her Digest:
While the terms " de facto recognition" and " de jure recognition" are frequently employed, the expressions "recognition of a de facto government, " situation, etc., are preferable. The character of the object recognized may be recognized as "de facto" in existence or control. In prevailing practice, when the United States extends recognition, it is recognition per se not "de facto" recognition.2
William O'Brien and Ulf Goebel apparently misunderstand Miss Whiteman when they cite the preceding quotation and conclude: "Thus, what the authors interpreted to be implicit de jure recognition of new states is termed recognition 'per se' by Miss Whiteman." 3 In reply to a letter from this writer requesting clarification concerning the terms per se and de jure and whether those terms were interchangeable in her usage as O'Brien and Goebel assume, Miss Whiteman left no doubt as to her meaning when she said:
I had hoped to make it clear in the Digest that in the past the United States has extended de jure recognition to both de jure and de facto governments, as the case may have been. It is the government that is de facto, not the U. S. recognition. I used the expression recognition "per se" meaning that the recognition was "recognition" not a tenuous or qualified recognition, not a de facto recognition.4 According to Miss Whiteman, then, the terms de facto and de jure refer only to the character of the government and not to the character of recognition.5 This view disagrees with the position that different legal and [Vol. 62 political consequences flow from de facto and de jure recognition by denying the latter distinction. Mr. Leonard Meeker, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, in an interview with the author in March, 1966, said that he was "not sure" if there was a difference between de facto and de jure recognition. Mr. Meeker then cited the case of the recognition of Israel in 1948 as an example of an instance when, for a time, "something less than de jure recognition might have been intended.'"
The significance of the case of Israel to the discussion necessitates a brief review of the situation. The British Mandate over the area that was to become the Jewish state of Israel was to end on May 14, 1948. That morning the Provisional Government of Israel sent a note to President Truman assuring him that the government had been "charged to assume the rights and duties of government" for that state and to discharge its international obligations. President Truman replied to the note that same day announcing that:
This country recognizes the Provisional Government as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel. When a permanent government is elected in Israel it will promptly be given de jure recognition.7
The statement definitely appears to indicate something less than the traditional concept of "de jure recognition." However, Philip Jessup, the Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council said in December, 1948 , "the United States extended immediate and full recognition to the state of Israel as a de facto authority of the new state.", The extension of "full recognition" indicates the traditional concept of "de jure recognition," while de facto authority describes the type of power the government enjoyed.
Further uncertainty was caused by a White House Press Release which announced that "de jure recognition" had been extended as of January 31. The release read:
On October 24, 1948, the President stated that when a permanent government was elected in Israel, it would promptly be given de jure recognition. Elections for such a government were held on January 25. . . . The United States Government is therefore pleased to extend de jure recognition to the Government of Israel as of January 31.9
Miss Whiteman includes a description of the case of Israel in Volume II of her Digest, but does not interpret it in the light of her statement that recognition is granted per se. In reply to a private letter of inquiry regarding this case, Miss Whiteman wrote:
. . . in the instance of Israel, U. S. officials repeatedly stated that the United States "recognizes" the provisional government as the "de facto authority" of Israel. The note of May 14, 1948 so stated, and it was followed by at least two other statements to the same effect.... The implication of the wording of the White House Press Release . . . was confusing. The May 1948 "recognition" had not been described as "de facto recognition." . . . I feel that a lot of people have been using "de facto" recognition when what they were referring to was recognition of a "de facto government. " 10 This is clearly a denial that the recognition of Israel was ever anything less than full and complete recognition.
Most authoritative writers on the subject would tend to agree with Miss Whiteman that there is no difference in legal effect between recognition which is labeled "de jure recognition" and recognition which is labeled "de facto recognition." 11 Indeed there is little evidence to support the position that there is a legal difference.
Some writers, however, maintain that de facto and de jure recognition are distinct legal acts justifiable under different circumstances 12 and producing different legal results. Proponents of this distinction maintain that de jure recognition allows a government to "represent the State in matters of State succession and otherwise," while de facto recognition does not.'3 This does not appear to be the case, though, as the Soviet Government's contention in 1922 that it could not be held liable for the debts of its predecessors until it had been extended de jure recognition was not accepted by the other world Powers at the time.'4 But since the succession to liabilities is the same, whether de facto or de jure recognition is extended, it cannot be argued consistently that a difference arises in the succession to rights.
It has also been held by this school of thought that "de facto recognition" is provisional while "de jure recognition" is not.15 However, the position of the State Department at the First Meeting of the Inter-American Council of Jurists at Rio de Janeiro in 1950 was that recognition is irrevocable, and the severance of diplomatic relations after recognition has been granted does not constitute revocation. The binding effect of recognition may be terminated only if the community recognized ceases to fulfill the requirements for recognition as a state (or government) in [Vol. 62 international law, or by the recognition of a successor to the previously recognized entity.
Many authorities have held that if the legal differences are open to question, there are political differences. The most important political difference between de facto and de jure recognition, they contend, is that it denotes the status of political relations between the parties involved. De jure recognition reflects an intimate relationship between the Powers, while de facto recognition lacks this intimacy. This argument seems to miss the point, since the relations between communities are determined by the circumstances peculiar to their relationship, not by the character of recognition. For example, the United States may have serious misgivings concerning the manner in which a government has come to power, as well as its foreign policy; nevertheless our interests may best be served by recognizing it and entering intimate relations with it. The recognition in itself should not be considered either approval or disapproval of the government.
Whatever the merits of the arguments for or against the distinction between de facto and de jure recognition, it is clear that the difference, if any, is becoming less clear. Research by the writer has shown that nothing less than full recognition has been extended to states and governments since the questionable case of Israel. The existence of de facto recognition is becoming a moribund issue simply by not being raised as a possibility by the government. The interpretation of Miss Whiteman as stated in her Digest will tend to be accepted without question with the passage of time. This will be due in no small measure to the authority that the State Department's Digest will lend to that position.
